

The acquisition in fee of these three large parcels within Kodiak NWR now requires the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to make payments in lieu of taxes to the Kodiak Island borough in accordance with the Revenue Sharing Act of 1935. The act directs the agency to make such payments based on the fair market value of acquired lands.

The service is currently using the federally approved appraisals estimating fair market value of these three large parcels as the basis for computing the revenue sharing payment to the borough. The borough has rightly challenged the service's determination of fair market value based on the unique circumstances of these acquisitions and the findings made by the trustee council in approving funds for these acquisitions.

A plain reading of the Revenue Sharing Act (which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to make revenue sharing payments) requires that the determinations of fair market value be made in a manner that "the Secretary considers to be equitable and in the public interest." Clearly, the public interest associated with these unique acquisitions has been well documented in the findings of the trustee council.

The Revenue Sharing Act imposes no legal impediment for the Secretary to make a determination of fair market value that incorporates the unique circumstances of these acquisitions and the specific findings and actions taken by the trustee council. Thus, I urge the Secretary to review the Kodiak Island borough's appeal to the service's determinations for making revenue sharing payments and do what is fair and equitable as called for by the act.

These are unique circumstances that exist nowhere else in the United States and are limited in Alaska to lands acquired in the Exxon Valdez spill zone with settlement funds. Thus, there should be no consequences for how revenue sharing payments are computed for service acquired lands in other parts of Alaska or throughout the rest of the country.

At this opportunity, upon the passage of another year's funding for the Federal and Indian lands management agencies, I must call to the attention of my colleagues and to the attention of the President of the United States, an issue that troubles me deeply. Over the years, our Government has made commitments to native Americans which it has not kept. Many Americans thought that practice ended with the new, more enlightened self-determination approach to Indian policy. But as one of Alaska's representatives in the Senate, members of the President's staff made personal promises to me just last fall on behalf of the native people of the Chugach region which have not been kept.

In 1971 Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). The act cleared the way for Alaska native people, including the

Chugach natives, to receive title to a small portion of their traditional lands as settlement of their aboriginal land claims. The act also cleared the way for the additional millions of acres to our national parks, wildlife refuges, forests, and wilderness areas. Allowing native people to develop their lands freed them from economic bondage to the Federal Government. No longer would they have to depend exclusively on the benevolence of the Federal Government for hand-outs. They could create their own jobs, generate their own income, and determine their own destiny. But only if they had access to their lands.

Both the administration and the Congress recognized the lands would be virtually valueless if there was no way to get to them. The Claims Act recognized that native lands were to be used for both traditional and economic development purposes. Alaska natives were guaranteed a right of access, under law, to their lands across the vast new parks, refuges, and forests that would be created.

In 1971 and again in 1982, under the terms of the Chugach Native Inc. settlement agreement, the Federal Government made a solemn vow to ensure the Chugach people had access to their aboriginal lands. Now, a quarter of a century later, that commitment has not been fulfilled. Many of the native leaders who worked with me to achieve the landmark Native Land Claims Settlement Act have died after waiting for decades without seeing that promise honored. Last year, Congressman DON YOUNG, chairman of the House Resources Committee, added a provision to the House Interior appropriations bill that required, by a date certain, the Federal Government to live up to the access promises it made to the Chugach natives decades ago. In the conference last fall on the omnibus appropriations bill, the administration spoke passionately and repeatedly against the provision.

Why? They fully admitted the obligation to grant an access easement exists. They acknowledged further that access delayed is access denied and that further delays were harmful to the Chugach people. They opposed the provision on the grounds that it was not necessary since they were going to move with all due haste to finalize the easement before the end of 1998. Katie McGinty, then head of the President's Council on Environmental Quality sat across from me, looked me in the eye, and promised me they would fulfill this long overdue promise before the end of the year.

She even offered to issue a "Presidential proclamation" promising once again to do what had already been promised and promised and promised. My staff worked with OMB on the content of such a proclamation, but I told them it would not be necessary. I would take her at her word and believed the administration would live up to the personal commitment she made to me.

Here we are a year later. Chugach still has not received its easement. Ms. McGinty is gone, but her commitment on behalf of this administration remains. It is now the responsibility of others to ensure the promises she made to me and to Alaska's native people are kept.

Congressman YOUNG's House resources Committee has reported a bill, H.R. 2547, to address this issue legislatively, in the hope of forcing the administration to do what it has promised to do. Senator MURKOWSKI has been tireless in his efforts to get the Federal Government to live up to the promises made to Alaskans concerning access to our State and native lands. I support those efforts.

But I take the time today to say clearly to this administration that the promises made by our Government to the Chugach people for access to their lands—and to me personally as their representative—must be honored. Make no mistake, if the promises made to me by officials in this administration last fall are not lived up to soon, if they oppose the efforts of Congressman YOUNG and Senator MURKOWSKI on this issue, if they continue to obfuscate and "slow roll" this commitment, it will be clear to all that his administration does not perceive the true meaning of Robert Service's memorable phrase: "A promise made is a debt unpaid!"

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President. On behalf of myself and my cosponsor, Minority Leader DASCHLE, I would like to insert in the RECORD a legislative history which describes the purpose of each section of S. 1528, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act of 1999. Throughout the negotiations of this language there has been quite a bit of misrepresentation of the purpose of this bill. I hope this will be useful in clearing the confusion.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the legislative history be inserted in the RECORD at this point.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY FOR S. 1528

SECTION 127—RECYCLING TRANSACTIONS

Summary

The Superfund Recycling Equity Act of 1999 (the language of S. 1528) seeks to correct the unintended consequence of CERCLA that actually discourages legitimate recycling. The Act recognizes that recycling is an activity distinct from disposal or treatment, thus sending material for recycling is not the same as arranging for disposal or treatment, and recyclable materials are not a waste. Removing the threat of CERCLA liability for recyclers will encourage more recycling at all levels.

The Act has three major elements. First, it creates a new CERCLA §127 which clarifies liability for recycling transactions. Second, it defines those recycling transactions for which there is no liability by providing that only those persons who can demonstrate that they "arranged for the recycling of recyclable material" as defined by the criteria in sections 127(c) through (e) are not liable under section 107(a)(3) or (a)(4). The specific definition of "arranged for recycling" varies depending upon the recyclable material involved. Third, a series of exclusions from the liability clarification are specified such that

persons who arranged for recycling as defined above may still be liable under CERCLA sections 107(a)(3) or (4) if the party bringing an action against such person can prove one of a number of criteria specified in § 127(f). Lastly, new CERCLA §§ 127(g) through 127(l) clarify several miscellaneous issues regarding the proper application of the liability clarification.

Discussion

§ 127(a)(1) is intended to make it clear that anyone who, subject to the requirements of § 127(b), (c), (d) and (e) arranged for the recycling of recyclable materials is not held liable under §§ 107(a)(3) or (4) of CERCLA. § 127 provides for relief from liability for both retroactive and prospective transactions.

§ 127(a)(2) is intended to preserve the legal defenses that were available to a party prior to enactment of this Act for those materials not covered by either the definition of a recyclable material in § 127(b) or the definition of a recycling transaction within the bill. It is not Congress' intent that the absence of a material or transaction from coverage under this Act create a stigma subjecting such material or transaction to Superfund liability.

§ 127(b)(1) is meant to include the broad spectrum of materials that are recycled and used in place of virgin material feedstocks. Whole scrap tires have been excluded from eligibility under this provision because of concerns about the environmental and health hazards associated with stockpiles of whole scrap tires. Processed tires including material from tires that have been cut or granulated, are eligible for the benefits of this provision.

The term "recyclable materials" is defined to include "minor amounts of material incident to or adhering to the scrap material . . ." This is because in the normal course of scrap processing various recovered materials may be commingled. An appliance may, for example, be run through a shredder that also shreds automobiles. As a result, the metal recovered from the appliance may come into contact with oil that entered the shredded incident to an automobile. Numerous other examples exist.

§ 127(b)(1)(A) is intended to exclude from the definition of recyclable material shipping containers between 30 and 3000 liters capacity which have hazardous substances other than metal bits and pieces in them. The terms "contained in" or "adhering to" do not include any metal alloy, including hazardous substances such as chromium or nickel, that are metallurgically or chemically bonded in the steel to meet appropriate container specifications.

§ 127(b)(1)(B) means that any item of material which contained PCBs at a concentration of more than 50 parts per million ("ppm") at the time of the transaction does not qualify as recyclable material. Material, which previously held a concentration of PCBs in excess of 50 ppm, but has been cleaned to levels below 50 ppm, would still qualify for exempt treatment. Item, in this context, is meant to apply only to a distinct unit of material, not an entire shipment.

This legislation builds a test to determine what are recycling transaction that should be encouraged under the legislation and what are recycling transactions that are really treatment or disposal arrangements cloaked in the mantle of recycling. The test specified in 127(c) applies to transactions involving scrap paper, plastic, glass, textiles, or rubber. Transactions can be a sale to a consuming facility; a return for recycling, whether or not accompanied by a fee; or other similar agreement.

§ 127(c), (d) and (e), the term "or otherwise arranging for the recycling of recyclable material" recognizes that while recyclables

have intrinsic value they may not always be sold for a net positive amount. Thus a transaction in which one who arranges for recycling does not receive any remuneration for the material but rather pays an amount, less than the cost of disposal, still qualifies for the protection afforded by this § 127.

A commercial specification grade as referred to in § 127(c)(9), can include specifications as those published by industry trade associations, or other historically or widely utilized specifications are acceptable. It is also recognized that specifications will continue to evolve as market conditions and technologies change.

For purposes of Sec. 127(c)(3), evidence of a market can include, but is not limited to: a third-party published price (including a negative price), a market with more than one buyer or one seller for which there is a documentable price, and a history of trade in the recyclable material.

§ 127(c)(3) means that for a transaction to be deemed arranging for recycling, a substantial portion, but not all, of the recyclable material must have been sold with the intention that the material would be used as a raw material, in place of a virgin material, in the manufacture of a new product. The fact that the recyclable material was not, for some reason beyond the control of the person who arranged for recycling, actually used in the manufacture of a new product should not be evidence that the requirements of this § 127 were not met.

Additionally, no single benchmark or recovery rate is appropriate given variable market conditions, changes in technology, and differences between commodities. Instead, a common sense evaluation of how much of the material is recovered is appropriate. For example, in order to be economically viable as a recycling transaction a relatively high volume of the inbound material is expected to be recovered for feedstocks of relatively low per unit economic value (such as paper or plastic), while a dramatically lower volume of material is expected to be recovered to justify the recycling of a feedstock of very high economic value (such as gold or silver).

It is not necessary that the person who arranged for recycling document that a substantial portion of the recyclable material was actually used to make a new product. Instead, the person need only be prepared to demonstrate that it is common practice for recyclable materials that he handles to be made available for use in the manufacture of a new saleable product. For example, if recyclable stainless steel is sold to a stainless steel smelter, it is presumptive that recycling will occur.

The first part of § 127(c)(4) acknowledges the fact that modern technology has developed to the point where some consuming facilities exclusively utilize recyclable materials as their raw material feedstock and manufacture a product that, had it been made at another facility, may have been manufactured using virgin materials. Thus, the fact that the recyclable material did not directly displace a virgin material as the raw material feedstock should not be evidence that the requirements of § 127 were not met.

Secondary feedstocks may compete both directly and indirectly with virgin or primary feedstocks. In some cases a secondary feedstock can directly substitute for a virgin material in the same manufacturing process. In other cases, however, a secondary feedstock used at a particular manufacturing plant may not be a direct substitute for a virgin feedstock, but the product of that plant completes with a product made elsewhere from virgin material. For example aluminum may be utilized at a given facility using either virgin or secondary feedstocks

meeting certain specifications. In this case, the virgin and secondary feedstock materials compete directly. A particular steel mill, however, may only utilize scrap iron and steel as a feedstock because of the design restrictions of the facility. If that mill makes a steel product that competes with the steel product of another mill, which utilizes a virgin feedstock, the conditions of this paragraph have been met. In this example, the two streams of feedstock materials do not directly compete, but the product made from them do. It is the intent of this paragraph that the person be able to demonstrate the general use for which the feedstock material was utilized. It is not the intent that the person show that a specific unit was incorporated into a new product.

Section 127 provides for relief from liability for both retroactive and prospective transactions. However, an additional requirement is placed on prospective transactions in this paragraph such that persons arranging for such transactions take reasonable care to determine the environmental compliance status of the facility to which the recyclable material is being sent. Reasonable care is determined using a variety of factors, of which no one factor is determinative. The clause "not procedural or administrative" is included to protect one who arranges for recycling from losing the protection afforded by § 127 due to a record keeping error, missed deadline or similar infraction by the consuming facility which is out of control of the person arranging for recycling. For transactions occurring prior to, or during the 90 days after, enactment of § 127 the requirements of § 127(c)(5) shall not be considered in determining whether § 127 shall apply.

The person arranging for the transaction must exercise reasonable care at the time of the transaction (i.e., at the time when the buyer and seller reach a meeting of the minds). Should a consuming facility's compliance record indicate past non-compliance with the environmental laws, but at the time the person arranged for the transaction the person exercised reasonable care to determine that the consuming facility was in compliance with all applicable laws, the transaction would qualify for relief under § 127.

In addition, the person must only determine the status of the consuming facility's compliance with laws, regulations, or orders, which directly apply to the handling, processing, reclamation, storage, or other management activity associated with the recyclable materials sent by the person. Thus, for example, a person who arranges for the recycling of scrap metal to a consuming facility would not be responsible for determining the consuming facility's compliance with regulations governing the consuming facilities production of its product, just the consuming facility's compliance with management of the scrap metal as an in-feed material.

It is common practice in the industry for scrap processors to otherwise arrange for the recycling of a secondary material through a broker. The broker chooses to which consuming facility the secondary material will be sold. In such cases, it is the responsibility of the broker, not the original person who entered into the transaction with the broker, to take reasonable care to determine the compliance status of the consuming facility. Likewise, a scrap processor may sell material to a consuming facility which in turn arranges for recycling of all or part of that material to another consuming facility. It is only the responsibility of the scrap processor to inquire into the compliance status of the party he arranged the transaction with, not subsequent parties.

In determining whether a person exercised reasonable care, the criteria to be applied should be considered in the context of the time of the transaction. Thus, when looking at "the price paid in the recycling transaction" in § 127(c)(6)(A) one should look not only at whether the price bore a reasonable relationship to other transactions for similar materials at the time of the transaction in question but should also take into account the circumstances surrounding the individual transaction such as whether it was part of a long term deal involving significant quantities. In addition, market conditions vary considerably over any given time period for any given commodity. Thus, when determining whether the price paid was reasonable, general market conditions, and variations should be considered.

Congress recognizes that small businesses often have less resources available to them than large businesses. Thus, § 127(c)(6)(B) acknowledges the fact that a small company may be able to determine less information about the consuming facility's operations than a large company. The size of an individual facility may be an important factor in the facility's ability to detect the nature of the consuming facility's operations.

§ 127(c)(6)(c) requires a responsible person who arranges for the recycling of a recyclable material to inquire of the appropriate environmental agencies as to the compliance status of the consuming facility. Federal, State, and local agencies may not respond quickly (or respond at all) to inquiries made regarding a specific facility's compliance record. § 127(c)(5) only requires a person to make reasonable inquiries; inquiries need not be made before every transaction. Inquiries need only be made to those agencies having primary responsibilities over environmental matters related to the handling, processing, etc. of the secondary materials involved in the recycling transaction.

§ 127(d)(1)(B) provides that a person who arranges for the recycling of scrap metal must meet all of the criteria set forth in § 127(c) as they relate to scrap metal and be in compliance with federal regulations or standards associated with scrap metal recycling that were in effect at the time of the transaction in question (not regulations promulgated or standards issued subsequent to the time of the transaction). In addition, compliance must only be shown with Solid Waste Disposal Act regulations, which were promulgated and came into effect subsequent to enactment of § 127.

Section 127(d)(1)(C) as modified by § 127(d)(2) is not intended to exclude from liability relief such activities as welding, cutting metals with a torch, "sweating" iron from aluminum or other similar activities.

Section 127(d)(3) defines scrap metal using the regulatory definition found at 40 CFR 261.1 The Administrator is given the authority to exclude, by regulation, scrap metals that are determined not to warrant the exclusion from liability. Because § 127 grants relief from liability both prospectively and retroactively, any exclusion by the Administrator would only apply to transactions occurring after notice, comment and the final promulgation of a rule to such effect.

Persons who arrange for the recycling of spent batteries must meet the criteria specified in § 127(e), in addition to the criteria already discussed above and laid out in § 127(c) for transactions involving scrap paper, plastic, glass, textiles, or rubber.

The act of recovering the valuable components of a battery refers to the breaking (or smelting) of the battery itself in order to reclaim the valuable components of such battery. The generation, transportation, and collection of such batteries by persons who arrange for their recycling is an activity dis-

tinct from recovery. Thus, a person who generates, transports, and/or collects a spent battery, but does not themselves break or smelt such battery, is not liable under §§ 107(a)(3) and (4) provided all other requirements set out in this Section are met.

Section 127(e)(2)(A) provides that for spent lead-acid batteries, the party seeking the exemption must show that it met the federal environmental regulations or standards in effect at the time of the transaction in question (not regulations or standards issued subsequent to the time of the transaction).

Persons who arrange for recycling as defined by the criteria specified in sections 127(a)-(e) and discussed above may be liable under CERCLA §§ 107(a)(3) or (4) if the party bringing an action against such a person can demonstrate that one of the exclusions provided for in section 127(f) apply. Thus, the burden is on the government or other complaining party to demonstrate the criteria specified in section 127(f).

§ 127(f)(1)(A) is intended to mean that an "objectively reasonable basis for belief" is not equivalent to the reasonable care standard. The objectively reasonable basis for belief standard is meant to be a more rigorous standard than the reasonable care standard.

§ 127(f)(1)(A)(i) means that in order for the government to show that a recycling transaction should not receive the benefit of § 127, it would have to prove that a person knew that the material would not be recycled. Moreover, it is not necessary that every component of the recyclable material be recycled and actually find its way into a new product in order to meet this requirement.

For the purposes of § 127(f)(1)(A)(ii), smelting, refining, sweating, melting, and other operations which are conducted by a consuming facility for purposes of materials recovery are not considered incineration, nor would they be categorized as burning as fuel or for energy recovery. However, nothing in this bill shall be construed to limit the definition of recycling so as to restrict, inhibit, or otherwise discourage the recovery of energy through pyroprocessing from scrap rubber and other recyclable materials by boilers and industrial furnaces (such as cement kilns).

§ 127(f)(1)(A)(iii) sets forth certain obligations upon one who arranges for a recycling transaction which occurs within the first 90 days after enactment and had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the consuming facility was not in substantive compliance with environmental laws and regulations. This is the corollary to § 127(c)(5). The clause "not procedural or administrative" is included to protect one who arranges for recycling from losing the protection afforded by § 127 due to record keeping error, missed deadline or similar infraction by the consuming facility which is out of control of the person arranging for recycling. There is no expectation that the person who arranged for recycling would necessarily have carried out any type of records search or made any extensive inquiries of administrative agencies.

The provision in § 127(f)(1)(B) is intended to apply to persons who intentionally add hazardous substances to the recyclable material in order to dispose or otherwise rid themselves of the substance.

§ 127(f)(1)(C) is intended to mean that reasonable care is to be judged based on industry practices and standards at the time of the transaction. Thus, in order to determine if a person failed to exercise reasonable care with respect to the management and handling of the recyclable material, one should look to the usual and customary management and handling practices in the industry at the time of the transaction.

In enacting § 127(i) Congress clearly intends that the exemptions from liability granted

by § 127 shall not affect any concluded judicial or administrative action. Concluded action means any lawsuit in which a final judgment has been entered or any administrative action, which has been resolved by consent decree, which has been filed in a court of law and approved by such court. Furthermore, § 127 shall not affect any pending judicial action brought by the United States prior to enactment of this section. Any pending judicial action, whether it was brought in a trial or appellate court, by a private party shall be subject to the grant of relief from liability. For purposes of this section, Congress intends that any third party action or joinder of defendants brought by a private party shall be considered a private party action, regardless of whether or not the original lawsuit was brought by the United States. Additionally, any administrative action brought by any governmental agency but not yet concluded as set forth above, shall be subject to the grant of relief from liability set forth in this § 127.

§ 127(l)(1) preserves the rights of a person to whom § 127(a)(1) does not apply to raise any defenses that might otherwise be raised under CERCLA. This is consistent with the explanation for § 127(a)(2).

By adding § 127(l)(2) Congress intended to make certain that no presumption of liability is created against a person solely because that person is not afforded the relief granted by § 127(a)(1).

Mr. DASCHLE. This past Wednesday—the day we finally produced a fragile budget agreement—marked the 199th anniversary of the first time Congress ever met in Washington, DC. They met that day in what was then an unfinished Capitol. Several times during the negotiations, the thought occurred to me that, if the same people who are running this Congress were in charge back then, the Capitol might still be unfinished.

These negotiations took longer, and were more difficult, than they needed to be. The good news is: We finally have a budget that will keep America moving in the right direction. Many longtime members and observers of Congress say this has been perhaps the most confusing, convoluted budget process they can remember.

There have been a lot of technical questions these last few weeks about accounting methods, economic growth projections, and CBO versus OMB scoring. But the big question—the fundamental question that was at the heart of this budget debate—is quite simple: Are we going to move forward—or backward?

We have chosen, thank goodness, to move forward. This budget continues the progress we've made over the last seven years. It maintains our hard-won fiscal discipline. It invests in America's future. And it honors our values.

This budget will put more teachers in our children's classrooms, and more police on our streets. It will enable us to honor our commitments to our parents, and fulfill America's obligations as a world leader. And, it will enable us to protect our environment and preserve precious wilderness areas for generations not yet born.

I want to thank the Majority Leader, my Democratic colleagues, especially Senator HARRY REID, our whip, and

Senator ROBERT BYRD, ranking member of the Appropriations Committee. I also want to thank some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, particularly Senator STEVENS, chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

In addition, I want to acknowledge and thank President Clinton and Vice President GORE, as well as the incredibly skillful, patient White House negotiating team, especially Chief of Staff John Podesta, Deputy Chief of Staff Sylvia Matthews, OMB Director Jack Lew, Larry Stein and Chris Jennings.

I also want to thank my own staff, and the staff of Appropriations Committee, who have worked many weekends, many late nights, to turn our ideas and debate into a workable budget document.

Finally, I want to acknowledge our dear friend, the late Senator John Chafee. Losing Senator Chafee so suddenly was one of the saddest moments in this difficult year. He embodied what is best about the Senate. He was a reasonable, honorable man who cared deeply about people. Completing the budget process was a major challenge. But in the end, I believe we have produced a budget John Chafee would have approved of.

This budget invests in our children's education—the best investment any nation can make. It maintains our commitment to reduce class size by hiring 100,000 teachers. It contains money to help communities repair old schools and build new ones. It will enable more children to get a Head Start in school, and in life. And it will allow more young people to attend after-school programs where they will be safe, and where they will have responsible adult supervision.

This budget protects Medicare beneficiaries by providing fair payments to the hospitals, clinics, home health care providers and nursing homes they rely on.

This budget will make our communities safer by putting 50,000 more police officers on the street—in addition to the 100,000 who have already been hired—and by investing in youth crime prevention.

This budget will help keep Americans healthy . . . by reducing hunger and malnutrition among pregnant women, infants and young children . . . and by increasing funding for the National Institute of Health and the national Centers for Disease Control.

This budget protects our environment. We took out riders that would have harmed our environment, and put in money to fund the President's Lands Legacy program.

This budget will help working families find affordable housing.

It will help farm and ranch families weather these hard times.

This budget protects our national security . . . by increasing military pay and readiness . . . and by reducing the nuclear threat at home and around the world.

This budget will help us fulfill our responsibilities as the world's only super-

power. It provides money to pay our UN arrears and fund the Wye Accord to promote peace to the Middle East. It will also enable us to ease the crushing burden of debt on some of the world's poorest countries, so those nations can begin to invest in their own futures.

At the beginning of the year, our Republican colleagues proposed an \$800 billion tax cut. For months, we all heard a lot of debate about what such a huge tax cut would mean. This budget makes it clear. There is no way we could have paid for an \$800 billion tax cut without exploding the deficit again, or raiding Medicare, education, and other programs working families depend on.

Instead of moving backwards on taxes, we're moving forward. We're cutting taxes the right way. We're widening the circle of opportunity . . . by extending the R&D tax credit, and other tax credits that stimulate the economy . . . and by empowering people with disabilities by allowing them to maintain their Medicare and Medicaid coverage when they return to work.

There is one other point I want to make about the budget: For every dollar Democrats succeeded in restoring these last few weeks . . . for teachers, and police officers and other critical priorities . . . we have provided a dollar in offsets. Dollar for dollar, every one of our priorities is paid for. If CBO determines that this budget exceeds the caps, the overspending is in the basic budget our Republican colleagues drafted—on their own.

THE UNFINISHED AGENDA

As I said, Mr. President, this budget does move the country in the right direction—but only incrementally. My great regret and frustration with this Congress, is that we have achieved so little beyond this budget.

Look what we are leaving undone! In a year in which gun violence horrified America . . . a year in which gun violence invaded our schools and even a day care center . . . the far right has prevented this Congress from passing even the most modest gun safety measures—measures that would make it harder for children and criminals to get guns.

The far right has prevented this Congress—so far—from passing a Patients' Bill of Rights. More than 90 percent of Americans—Democrats and Republicans—support a real Patients' Bill of Rights that holds HMOs accountable. So does the AMA, the American Nurses Association—and 200 other health care and consumer organizations. And so does a bipartisan majority in both the House and Senate. Yet the Republican leaders in this Congress continue to use parliamentary tricks to deny patients their rights. As we leave here for the year, HMO reform, like gun safety, has been stuck for months in the black hole of conference committees.

The Republican leadership clearly is hoping that we will forget about all the shootings . . . forget about the families

who have been injured because some HMO accountant overruled their doctor and denied needed medical treatment. I am here to tell them: The American people will not forget. And neither will Senate Democrats.

We will fight to close the gun show loophole. And we will fight to pass a real Patients' Bill of Rights next year. We will continue the fight for meaningful campaign finance reform. We will continue the fight to preserve and strengthen Medicare—including adding a prescription drug benefit. We will resume the fight for a decent minimum wage increase. We will fight for a fair resolution of the dairy-pricing issue. And, we will restore the rural loan guarantee program for satellite TV service, so rural Americans aren't left with second-class service.

It's taken a long time, but we finally have a budget that keeps America moving in the right direction. That is a relief, and a victory for the American people. But we still have a long way to go. We are leaving here with too many urgent needs unmet. We must do better next year.

Mr. LOTT, Mr. President, today the Superfund Recycling Equity Act, S. 1528, is being sent to the President as part of H.R. 3194. This is a great day for environmental law—this is the day that the public policy restores recycling as a rewarded, rather than punished activity.

This is a great day because partisan feuding was set aside so that the Congress could find a realistic, incremental, and common sense environmental fix. The freestanding Superfund Recycling Equity Act has strong bipartisan support with 68 cosponsors—68 Senators who have worked together to advance a fix to a small piece of the Superfund debate.

In this controversial world of environmental legislation it is rare that the leaders of the two parties in either Congressional body would agree on a piece of legislation. Well, here in the Senate we do. I wish to thank Minority Leader DASCHLE who understood the merits of recycling and twice joined with me to sponsor this legislation. Without his leadership, this legislation would not have been possible.

Mr. President, I would also like to commend the Senators who originally joined Senator DASCHLE and me in introducing this legislation. Senators WARNER and LINCOLN, who sponsored this measure in a previous Congress, have long exhibited their enthusiasm for fixing recycling rules. They are true leaders—leaders who have fostered this reasonable, workable, environmental proposal. Senator BAUCUS, the Ranking Minority Member of the Environment and Public Works Committee, has also been an avid supporter of recycling by including a version of the Superfund Recycling Equity Act in his comprehensive Superfund reform bill in the 103rd Congress. His six years of leadership in trying to fix public policy for recyclers is appreciated.

Mr. President, this bill would not be where it is at today, on the cusp of becoming law, had it not been for the active support of the late Senator John Chafee—a dear friend to me and many of our colleagues. John Chafee was a respected leader of the Environment and Public Works Committee. His advice and counsel helped shape my bill and he was an original cosponsor. I am proud to have been associated with him on this bill and its legislative process. I consider it a tribute that this bipartisan bill, negotiated with the Administration, representatives of the national environmental community, and the recycling industry, was supported by John Chafee, a man for whom consensus was so important. I believe this is not a footnote to John Chafee's legacy; rather I believe that he made this kind of cooperation possible.

The former mayor of Warwick, Rhode Island, is now the newly appointed Senator from Rhode Island. I have already had an opportunity to hear our newest senator—Senator LINCOLN CHAFEE—tell me about what Warwick has done with regards to recycling. It is a proud record—a record that would be extended and enhanced by this bill. I find it a credit to John Chafee's legacy that his son would be working with me on this legislation. Less than a month in the Senate and already LINCOLN's voice is being heard in ways that will directly help Rhode Island.

Mr. President, I also must recognize the vision of trade associations like American Petroleum Institute and National Federation of Independent Businesses for supporting an incremental solution. It would have been easier for these groups to oppose the bill because it did not address all the fixes for which they have been advocating. However, AFI and NFIB recognized that this increment would not jeopardize their efforts; rather it exemplifies the efforts of various stakeholders to accomplish something positive for the environment albeit it incremental.

And finally, I must thank the various staff members who have diligently worked toward the passage of this legislation: Eric Washburn and Peter Hanson of Senator DASCHLE's staff, Tom Gibson and Barbara Rogers of the Environment and Public Works committee staff, Charles Barnett of Senator LINCOLN's staff, Ann Loomis of Senator WARNER's staff, and my former staffer, Kristy Simms, who set the stage for this years success.

While too often Senators have seen various interest groups tell Congress why we cannot achieve some worthy environmental goal, the history of the Superfund Recycling Equity Act is replete with evidence of people coming together to correct a problem. Everyone, including myself, realizes that comprehensive reform is necessary to fix the vast array of problems in many different sectors of the environmental community. Unfortunately, we do not live in a perfect world, so Congress must do what is achievable whenever it

is possible. This is good public policy—increments will show all parties there is a bridge for bipartisan environmental fixes. Recycling is the first of many necessary fixes, and I would bet my colleagues that it will not be the last fix.

This is a great day for many environmental groups who saw a change that they supported, not be taken hostage by the debate that has for so many years paralyzed reforms to Superfund. The original negotiation that resulted in the basis of the bill was tough and long—but it was fair. Each of the negotiating partners left items on the table that they would have wanted in an otherwise perfect world. Their collective approach was always bipartisan—they never pitted one party against another by pledging one group of interests against another. They remained loyal to their agreement for an unheard of five years—an eternity in Washington. Though this legislation was a long time in coming, I am grateful for its passage.

Mr. President, this is a great day for my good friend and fellow Mississippian, Phillip Morris. It is also a great day for the thousands of mom-and-pop recycling firms across America, like the one owned by Phillip Morris. This legislation protects the legacy of these firms which in most cases have been handed down through generations—often started by new immigrants to America nearly a hundred years ago. This ends the long Superfund nightmare that our nation's recyclers have suffered. Each time they sold their recyclable products they were, unintentionally, exposing themselves to costly Superfund liability. Removing Superfund as an impediment to recycling is a predicate to higher recycling rates throughout the nation.

The Superfund Equity Act is not about special interests getting a fix. No, this bill is about representing constituent interests throughout America and promoting the public interest. That is why Senator DASCHLE and I have 68 cosponsors—cosponsors that range completely across the liberal and conservative political spectrum, and range across all regions of America.

Mr. President, let me be clear, the Superfund Recycling Equity Act corrects a mistake nobody intended to make. When the Comprehensive Emergency Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) was enacted in 1980, there was no suggestion that traditional recyclables—paper, plastic, glass, metal, textiles, and rubber were ever intended to be subject to Superfund liability. As a result of court interpretations, however, the sale of recyclables as manufacturing feedstock was considered to be arranging for the disposal of the material and, therefore, subject to Superfund's liability scheme. However, as we have all come to know as a matter of public policy, recycling is not disposal; it is the exact opposite of disposal.

Mr. President, let me say that again—recycling is not disposal, and a

law is needed to remove this confusion. Sad, but true.

Enactment of this legislation clarifies this point and corrects the misinterpretations that have cost recyclers—primarily small family-owned businesses—millions and millions of dollars for problems they did not cause. With passage of the Superfund Recycling Equity Act, the costs of cleanup at sites that utilize recyclable materials as feedstock will be borne, rightfully, by those persons who actually cause or contribute to the pollution. As a result, those facilities will be less likely to cause contamination because they will no longer have recyclers to help them pay for Superfund cleanup. That's a powerful market incentive and will cause the consuming facility to become more environmentally conscientious.

Let me be clear, this legislation will not alter the basic tenants of environmental law—polluters will still pay. This legislation does not relieve recyclers of Superfund liability where they have polluted their own facilities. It also does not protect these businesses when they have sent materials destined for disposal to landfills or other facilities where those materials contributed, in whole or in part, to the pollution of those facilities. Furthermore, the public can expect recyclers to continue to be environmentally vigilant because they must operate their businesses in an environmentally sound manner, in order to be relieved of Superfund liability.

Today is a victory for coalition building that avoids the attack strategies that are so often employed by trade associations in DC. I hope they see the wisdom in building coalitions around achievable increments. This is how Congress can move forward. This is how Congress shows that it not only hears from its constituents but it acts successfully. Hostage taking, distortion, and scorch the earth approaches are not productive legislative strategies or lobbying tactics. Trade associations need to seek achievable solutions, develop responsible legislative goals, and avoid Beltway attack politics. I am extremely pleased that Congress has been able to take this tiny but very important step forward in reforming the Superfund law. I hope this accomplishment will inspire others to work for sensible, incremental solutions that help both our environment and our nation's economy.

I am proud that today Congress leveled the playing field and created equity in the statutory treatment of recycled material and virgin materials. I am proud to have removed the disincentives to recycling without loosening any existing liability laws for polluters. I am proud to have represented the mom and pop recyclers across America. I'm especially proud of the fact that this was all done in a bipartisan manner.

